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Abstract
Solution concepts of traditional game theory assume entirely
rational players; therefore, their ability to exploit subrational
opponents is limited. One type of subrationality that describes
human behavior well is the quantal response. While there
exist algorithms for computing solutions against quantal op-
ponents, they either do not scale or may provide strategies
that are even worse than the entirely-rational Nash strate-
gies. This paper aims to analyze and propose scalable algo-
rithms for computing effective and robust strategies against a
quantal opponent in normal-form and extensive-form games.
Our contributions are: (1) we define two different solution
concepts related to exploiting quantal opponents and analyze
their properties; (2) we prove that computing these solutions
is computationally hard; (3) therefore, we evaluate several
heuristic approximations based on scalable counterfactual re-
gret minimization (CFR); and (4) we identify a CFR variant
that exploits the bounded opponents better than the previously
used variants while being less exploitable by the worst-case
perfectly-rational opponent.
1 Introduction
Extensive-form games are a powerful model able to describe
recreational games, such as poker, as well as real-world situ-
ations from physical or network security. Recent advances in
solving these games, and particularly the Counterfactual Re-
gret Minimization (CFR) framework (Zinkevich et al. 2008),
allowed creating superhuman agents even in huge games,
such as no-limit Texas hold’em with approximately 10160
different decision points (Moravk et al. 2017; Brown and
Sandholm 2018). The algorithms generally approximate a
Nash equilibrium, which assumes that all players are per-
fectly rational, and is known to be inefficient in exploiting
weaker opponents. An algorithm that would be able to take
an opponent’s imperfection into account is expected to win
by a much larger margin (Johanson and Bowling 2009; Bard
et al. 2013).
The most common model of bounded rationality in hu-
mans is the quantal response (QR) model (McKelvey and
Palfrey 1995, 1998). Multiple experiments identified it as
a good predictor of human behavior in games (Yang, Or-
donez, and Tambe 2012; Haile, Hortac¸su, and Kosenok
Copyright © 2021, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
2008). QR is also the hearth of the algorithms success-
fully deployed in the real world (Yang, Ordonez, and Tambe
2012; Fang et al. 2017). It suggests that players respond
stochastically, picking better actions with higher probabil-
ity. Therefore, we investigate how to scalably compute a
good strategy against a quantal response opponent in
two-player normal-form and extensive-form games.
If both players choose their actions based on the QR
model, their behavior is described by quantal response equi-
librium (QRE). Finding QRE is a computationally tractable
problem (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995; Turocy 2005), which
can be also solved using the CFR framework (Farina, Kroer,
and Sandholm 2019). However, when creating AI agents
competing with humans, we want to assume that one of the
players is perfectly rational, and only the opponent’s ra-
tionality is bounded. A tempting approach may be using the
algorithms for computing QRE and increasing one player’s
rationality or using generic algorithms for exploiting oppo-
nents (Davis, Burch, and Bowling 2014) even though the QR
model does not satisfy their assumptions, as in (Basak et al.
2018). However, this approach generally leads to a solution
concept we call Quantal Nash Equilibrium, which we show
is very inefficient in exploiting QR opponents and may even
perform worse than an arbitrary Nash equilibrium.
Since the very nature of the quantal response model as-
sumes that the sub-rational agent responds to a strategy
played by its opponent, a more natural setting for study-
ing the optimal strategies against QR opponents are Stackel-
berg games, in which one player commits to a strategy that
is then learned and responded to by the opponent. Optimal
commitments against quantal response opponents - Quantal
Stackelberg Equilibrium (QSE) - have been studied in secu-
rity games (Yang, Ordonez, and Tambe 2012), and the re-
sults were recently extended to normal-form games (Cˇerny´
et al. 2020). Even in these one-shot games, polynomial algo-
rithms are available only for their very limited subclasses. In
extensive-form games, we show that computing the QSE is
NP-hard, even in zero-sum games. Therefore, it is very un-
likely that the CFR framework could be adapted to closely
approximate these strategies. Since we aim for high scala-
bility, we focus on empirical evaluation of several heuristics,
including using QNE as an approximation of QSE. We iden-
tify a method that is not only more exploitative than QNE,
but also more robust when the opponent is rational.
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Our contributions are: 1) We analyze the relationship and
properties of two solution concepts with quantal opponents
that naturally arise from Nash equilibrium (QNE) and Stack-
elberg equilibrium (QSE). 2) We prove that computing QNE
is PPAD-hard even in NFGs, and computing QSE in EFGs
is NP-hard. Therefore, 3) we investigate the performance of
CFR-based heuristics against QR opponents. The extensive
empirical evaluation on four different classes of games with
up to 108 histories identifies a variant of CFR-f (Davis,
Burch, and Bowling 2014) that computes strategies better
than both QNE and NE.
2 Background
Even though our main focus is on extensive-form games, we
study the concepts in normal-form games, which can be seen
as their conceptually simpler special case. After defining the
models, we proceed to define quantal response and the met-
rics for evaluating a deployed strategy’s quality.
Two-player Normal-form Games
A two-player normal-form game (NFG) is a tuple G =(N,A,u) where N = {△,▽} is set of players. We use i
and −i for one player and her opponent. A = {A△,A▽} de-
notes the set of ordered sets of actions for both players. The
utility function ui ∶ A△ ×A▽ → R assigns a value for each
pair of actions. A game is called zero-sum if u△ = −u▽.
Mixed strategy σi ∈ Σi is a probability distribution over
Ai. For any strategy profile σ ∈ Σ = {Σ△ × Σ▽} we use
ui(σ) = ui(σi, σ−i) as the expected outcome for player i,
given the players follow strategy profile σ. A best response
(BR) of player i to the opponent’s strategy σ−i is a strategy
σBRi ∈ BRi(σ−i), where ui(σBRi , σ−i) ≥ ui(σ′i, σ−i) for
all σ′i ∈ Σi. An -best response is σBRi ∈ BRi(σ−i),  >
0, where ui(σBRi , σ−i) +  ≥ ui(σ′i, σ−i) for all σ′i ∈ Σi.
Given a normal-form game G = (N,A,u), a tuple of mixed
strategies (σNEi , σNE−i ), σNEi ∈ Σi, σNE−i ∈ Σ−i is a Nash
Equilibrium if σNEi is an optimal strategy of player i against
strategy σNE−i . Formally: σNEi ∈ BR(σNE−i ) ∀i ∈ {△,▽}
In many situations, the roles of the players are asym-
metric. One player (leader - △) has the power to commit
to a strategy, and the other player (follower - ▽) plays the
best response. This model has many real-world applica-
tions (Tambe 2011); for example, the leader can correspond
to a defense agency committing to a protocol to protect crit-
ical facilities. The common assumption in the literature is
that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader. Then, the
concept is called a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE).
A leader’s strategy σSSE ∈ Σ△ is a Strong Stack-
elberg Equilibrium if σ△ is an optimal strategy of the
leader given that the follower best-responds. Formally:
σSSE△ = arg maxσ′△∈Σ△ u△(σ′△,BR▽(σ′△)). In zero-sum
games, SSE is equivalent to NE (Conitzer and Sandholm
2006) and the expected utility is denoted value of the game.
Two-player Extensive-form Games
A two-player extensive-form game (EFG) consist of a set of
playersN = {△,▽, c}, where c denotes the chance.A is a fi-
nite set of all actions available in the game.H ⊂ {a1a2⋯an ∣
aj ∈ A,n ∈ N} is the set of histories in the game. We assume
that H forms a non-empty finite prefix tree. We use g ⊏ h to
denote that h extends g. The root ofH is the empty sequence∅. The set of leaves of H is denoted Z and its elements z
are called terminal histories. The histories not in Z are non-
terminal histories. By A(h) = {a ∈ A ∣ ha ∈ H} we denote
the set of actions available at h. P ∶H∖Z → N is the player
function which returns who acts in a given history. Denoting
Hi = {h ∈ H ∖ Z ∣ P (h) = i}, we partition the histories as
H =H△∪H▽∪Hc∪Z. σc is the chance strategy defined on
Hc. For each h ∈Hc, σc(h) is a probability distribution over
A(h). Utility functions assign each player utility for each
leaf node, ui ∶ Z → R.
The game is of imperfect information if some actions or
chance events are not fully observed by all players. The in-
formation structure is described by information sets for each
player i, which form a partition Ii of Hi. For any informa-
tion set Ii ∈ Ii, any two histories h,h′ ∈ Ii are indistin-
guishable to player i. Therefore A(h) = A(h′) whenever
h,h′ ∈ Ii. For Ii ∈ Ii we denote by A(Ii) the set A(h) and
by P (Ii) the player P (h) for any h ∈ Ii.
A strategy σi ∈ Σi of player i is a function that assigns
a distribution over A(Ii) to each Ii ∈ Ii. A strategy profile
σ = (σ△, σ▽) consists of strategies for both players. piσ(h)
is the probability of reaching h if all players play according
to σ. We can decompose piσ(h) = ∏i∈N piσi (h) into each
player’s contribution. Let piσ−i be the product of all players’
contributions except that of player i (including chance). For
Ii ∈ Ii define piσ(Ii) = ∑h∈Ii piσ(h), as the probability of
reaching information set Ii given all players play according
to σ. piσi (Ii) and piσ−i(Ii) are defined similarly. Finally, let
piσ(h, z) = piσ(z)
piσ(h) if h ⊏ z, and zero otherwise. piσi (h, z) and
piσ−i(h, z) are defined similarly. Using this notation, expected
payoff for player i is ui(σ) = ∑z∈Z ui(z)piσ(z). BR, NE
and SSE are defined as in NFGs.
Define ui(σ,h) as an expected utility given that the his-
tory h is reached and all players play according to σ. A coun-
terfactual value vi(σ, I) is the expected utility given that the
information set I is reached and all players play according
to strategy σ except player i, which plays to reach I . For-
mally, vi(σ, I) = ∑h∈I,z∈Z piσ−i(h)piσ(h, z)ui(z). And simi-
larly counterfactual value for playing action a in information
set I is vi(σ, I, a) = ∑h∈I,z∈Z,ha⊏z piσ−i(ha)piσ(ha, z)ui(z).
We define Si as a set of sequences of actions only for
player i. inf1(si), si ∈ Si is the information set where last
action of si was executed and seqi(I), I ∈ Ii is sequence of
actions of player i to information set I .
Quantal Response Model of Bounded Rationality
Fully rational players always select the utility-maximizing
strategy, i.e., the best response. Relaxing this assumption
leads to a “statistical version” of best response, which takes
into account the inevitable error-proneness of humans and
allows the players to make systematic errors (McFadden
1976; McKelvey and Palfrey 1995).
Definition 1. Let G = (N,A,u) be an NFG. Function
QR ∶ Σ△ → Σ▽ is a quantal response function of player▽ if probability of playing action a monotonically increases
as expected utility for a increases. Quantal function QR is
called canonical if for some real-valued function q:
QR(σ, ak) = q(u▽(σ, ak))∑ai∈A▽ q(u▽(σ, ai)) ∀σ ∈ Σ△, ak ∈ A▽.
(1)
Whenever q is a strictly positive increasing function, the
correspondingQR is a valid quantal response function. Such
functions q are called generators of canonical quantal func-
tions. The most commonly used generator in the literature
is the exponential (logit) function (McKelvey and Palfrey
1995) defined as q(x) = eλx where λ > 0. λ drives the
model’s rationality. The player behaves uniformly randomly
for λ→ 0, and becomes more rational as λ→∞. We denote
a logit quantal function as LQR.
In EFGs, we assume the bounded-rational player plays
based on a quantal function in every information set sepa-
rately, according to the counterfactual values.
Definition 2. LetG be an EFG. FunctionQR ∶ Σ△ → Σ▽ is
a canonical couterfactual quantal response function of player▽ with generator q if for a strategy σ△ it produces strategy
σ▽ such that in every information set I ∈ I▽, for each action
ak ∈ A(I) it holds that
QR(σ△, I, ak) = q(v▽(σ, I, ak))∑ai∈A(I) q(v▽(σ, I, ai)) , (2)
where QR(σ△, I, ak) is the probability of playing action ak
in information set I and σ = (σ△, σ▽).
We denote the canonical counterfactual quantal response
function with the logit generator counterfactual logit quan-
tal response (CLQR). CLQR differs from the traditional def-
inition of logit agent quantal response (LAQR) (McKelvey
and Palfrey 1998) in using counterfactual values instead of
expected utilities. The main advantage of CLQR over LAQR
is that CLQR defines a valid quantal strategy even in infor-
mation sets unreachable due to a strategy of the opponent,
which is necessary for applying regret-minimization algo-
rithms explained later.
Because the logit quantal function is the most well-
studied function in the literature with several deployed appli-
cations (Pita et al. 2008; Delle Fave et al. 2014; Fang et al.
2017), we focus most of our analysis and experimental re-
sults on (C)LQR. Without a loss of generality, we assume
the quantal player is always player ▽.
Metrics for Evaluating Quality of Strategy
In a two-player zero-sum game, the exploitability of a given
strategy is defined as expected utility that a fully rational
opponent can achieve above the value of the game. For-
mally, exploitability E(σi) of strategy σi ∈ Σi is E(σi) =
u−i(σi, σ−i) − u−i(σNE) σ−i ∈ BR−i(σi).
We also intend to measure how much we are able to
exploit an opponent’s bounded-rational behavior. For this
purpose, we define gain of a strategy against quantal re-
sponse as an expected utility we receive above the value of
the game. Formally, gain G(σi) of strategy σi is defined asG(σi) = ui(σi,QR(σi)) − ui(σNE).
General-sum games do not have the property that all NEs
have the same expected utility. Therefore, we simply mea-
sure expected utility against LQR and BR opponents there.
3 One-Sided Quantal Solution Concepts
This section formally defines two one-sided bounded-
rational equilibria, where one of the players is rational
and the other subrational – a saddle-point-type equilib-
rium called Quantal Nash Equilibrium (QNE) and a leader-
follower-type equilibrium called Quantal Stackelberg Equi-
librium (QSE). We show that contrary to their fully-
rational counterparts, QNE differs from QSE even in zero-
sum games. Moreover, we show that computing QSE in
extensive-form games is an NP-hard problem.
Quantal Equilibria in Normal-form Games
We first consider a variant of NE, in which one of the players
plays a quantal response instead of the best response.
Definition 3. Given a normal-form game G = (N,A,u)
and a quantal response function QR, a strategy profile(σQNE△ ,QR(σQNE△ )) ∈ Σ describes a Quantal Nash Equi-
librium (QNE) if and only if σQNE△ is a best response of
player △ against quantal-responding player ▽. Formally:
σQNE△ ∈ BR(QR(σQNE△ )). (3)
QNE can be seen as a concept between NE and Quantal
Response Equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995).
While in NE, both players are fully rational, and in QRE,
both players are assumed to behave bounded-rationally, in
QNE, one player is rational, and the other is bounded-
rational.
Theorem 1. Computing a QNE strategy profile in two-
player NFGs is a PPAD-hard problem.
Proof (Sketch). We do a reduction from the problem of com-
puting -NE. We derive an upper bound on a maximum
distance between best response and logit quantal response,
which goes to zero with λ approaching infinity. For a given
, we find λ, such that QNE is -NE. The full proof is pro-
vided in the appendix.
QNE usually outperforms NE against LQR in practice as
we show in the experiments. However, it cannot be guaran-
teed as stated in the Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. For any LQR function, there exists a zero-
sum normal-form game G = (N,A,u) with a unique NE -(σNE△ , σNE▽ ) and QNE - (σQNE△ ,QR(σQNE△ )) such that
u△(σNE△ ,QR(σNE△ )) > u△(σQNE△ ,QR(σQNE△ )).1
The second solution concept is a variant of SSE in situa-
tions, when the follower is bounded-rational.
Definition 4. Given a normal-form gameG = (N,A,u) and
a quantal response function QR, a mixed strategy σQSE△ ∈
Σ△ describes a Quantal Stackleberg Equilibrium (QSE) if
and only if
σQSE△ = arg max
σ△∈Σ△ u△(σ△,QR(σ△)). (4)
1Full proofs of all propositions are in the appendix.
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Figure 1: (Left) An example of the expected utility against
LQR in Game 1. The X-axis shows the strategy of the ratio-
nal player, and the Y-axis the expected utility. The X- and
Y-value curves show the utility for playing the correspond-
ing action given the opponent’s strategy is a response to the
strategy on X-axis. A detailed description is in Example 1.
(Right) An example of two normal-form games. Each row
of the depicted matrices is labeled by a first player strategy,
while the second player’s strategy labels every column. The
numbers in the matrices denote the utilities of the first player.
We assume the row player is △.
In QSE, player △ is fully rational and commits to a strat-
egy that maximizes her payoff given that player ▽ observes
the strategy and then responds according to her quantal func-
tion. This is a standard assumption, and even in problems
where the strategy is not known in advance, it can be learned
by playing or observing. QSE always exists because all utili-
ties are finite, the game has a finite number of actions, player△ utilities are continuous on her strategy simplex, and the
maximum is hence always reached.
Observation 3. Let G be a normal-form game and a q be
a generator of a canonical quantal function. Then QSE of G
can be formulated as a non-convex mathematical program:
max
σ△∈Σ△
∑a▽∈A▽ u△(σ△, a▽)q(u▽(σ△, pi▽)∑a▽∈A▽ q(u▽(σ△, a▽)) . (5)
Example 1. In Figure 1 we present an example of utility
against LQR in Game 1 with λ = 0.92. We show QNE in
which both actions have the same expected utility. Therefore
it is a best response for Player △, and she has no incentive
to deviate. However, it is not optimal with regard to maximal
expected utility, which is achieved in two global extremes,
both being QSE. We can also observe that even a small game
like Game 1 can have multiple local extremes in this case 3.
Example 1 shows that finding QSE is a non-concave prob-
lem even in zero-sum NFGs, and it can have multiple global
solutions. Moreover, facing a bounded-rational opponent
may change the relationship between NE and SSE. They
are no longer interchangeable, even in zero-sum games, and
QSE may use strictly dominated actions.
Quantal Equilibria in Extensive-form Games
In EFGs, QNE and QSE are defined in the same manner as
in NFGs. However, instead of the normal-form quantal re-
sponse, the second player acts according to the counterfac-
tual quantal response. QSE in EFGs can be computed by a
mathematical program provided in the appendix. The natural
formulation of the program is non-linear with non-convex
constraints indicating the problem is hard. We show that the
problem is indeed NP-hard, even in zero-sum games.
Theorem 4. Let G be a two-player imperfect-information
EFG with perfect recall andQR be a quantal response func-
tion. Computing an optimal strategy of a rational player
against the quantal response opponent in G is an NP-hard
if one of the following holds: (1) G is zero-sum and QR is
generated by a logit generator q(x) = exp(λx) for some
λ > 0; or (2) G is general-sum.
Proof (Sketch). We reduce from the set partition. The key
part of the constructed EFG is zero-sum. For each item of the
partition problem, the leader chooses an action that places
the item to one or the other subset. The follower has two
actions; each gives the leader a reward of the sum of items
in one subset. If the sums are different, the follower chooses
the lower one. If they are the same, the follower chooses both
of them uniformly, which maximizes the leader’s payoff.
A complication is that the leader could split each item in
half by playing uniformly. This is prevented by combining
the leader’s actions for placing an item with an action in a
separate game with two symmetric QSEs. Such a game is the
collaborative coordination game in the non-zero-sum case
and a game similar to Figure 1 in the zero-sum case.
The proof of the non-zero-sum part of Theorem 4 only
requires the follower to play action with a higher reward
with higher probability. This also holds for a rational player;
hence, the theorem provides an independent, simpler, and
more general proof of NP-hardness of computing Stack-
elberg equilibria in EFGs, which unlike (Letchford and
Conitzer 2010) does not rely on the tie-breaking rule.
4 Computing Bounded-rational Equilibria
This section describes various algorithms and heuristics for
computing one-sided quantal equilibria introduced in the
previous section. In the first part, we focus on QNE, and
based on an empirical evaluation; we claim that regret-
minimization algorithms converge to QNE in both NFGs
and EFGs. The second part then discusses gradient-based al-
gorithms for computing QSE and analyses cases when regret
minimization methods will or will not converge to QSE.
Algorithms for Computing QNE
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al.
2008) is a state-of-the-art algorithm for approximating NE
in extensive-form games. CFR is a form of regret matching
(Hart and Mas-Colell 2000) and uses iterated self play to
minimize regret at each information set independently. CFR-
f (Davis, Burch, and Bowling 2014) is a modification capa-
ble of computing strategy against some opponent models. In
each iteration, it performs a CFR update for one player and
computes the response for the other player. We use CFR-f
with a quantal response and call it CFR-QR. In normal-form
games, we use the same approach with simple regret match-
ing (RM-QR).
Conjecture 5. (1) In NFGs, RM-QR converges to QNE. (2)
In EFGs, CFR-QR converges to QNE.
We performed an empirical evaluation on more than 2 ×
104 games. In each game, the resulting strategy of player△ was -BR to the quantal response of the opponent with
epsilon lower than 10−6 after less than 105 iterations.
Furthermore, the performance of QNE is at the cost of
substantial exploitability. We propose two heuristics that ad-
dress both of the issues simultaneously. The first one is to
play a convex combination of QNE and NE strategy. We call
this heuristical algorithm COMB. We aim to find a param-
eter α of the combination that maximizes the utility against
LQR. However, choosing the correct α is, in general, a non-
convex, non-linear problem. We search for the best α by
sampling possible αs and choosing the one with the best util-
ity. The time required to compute one combination’s value
is similar to the time required to perform one iteration of the
RM-QR algorithm. Sampling the αs and checking all the
sampled parameters hence does not affect the scalability of
COMB. The gain is also guaranteed to be greater or equal to
the gain of the NE strategy, and as we show in the results,
some combinations achieve higher gains than both the QNE
and the NE strategies.
The second heuristic uses a restricted response ap-
proach (Johanson, Zinkevich, and Bowling 2008), and we
call it restricted quantal response (RQR). The key idea
is that during the regret minimization, we set probability p,
such that in each iteration, the opponent updates her strat-
egy using (i) LQR with probability p and (ii) BR otherwise.
We aim to choose the parameter p such that it maximizes the
expected payoff. Using sampling as in COMB is not possi-
ble, since each sample requires to rerun the whole RM. To
avoid the expensive computation, we start with p = 0.5 and
update the value during the iterations. In each iteration, we
approximate the gradient of gain with respect to p based on a
change in the value after both the LQR and the BR iteration.
We move the value of p in the gradient’s approximated direc-
tion with a step size that decreases after each iteration. How-
ever, the strategies do change tremendously with p, and the
algorithm would require many iterations to produce a mean-
ingful average strategy. Therefore, after a few thousands of
iterations, we fix the parameter p and perform a clean sec-
ond run, with p fixed from the first run. Similarly to COMB,
RQR achieves higher gains than both the QNE and the NE
and performs exceptionally well in terms of exploitability
with gains comparable to COMB.
We adapted both algorithms from NFGs also to EFGs.
The COMB heuristic requires to compute a convex combi-
nation of strategies, which is not straightforward in EFGs.
Let p be a combination coefficient and σ1i , σ
2
i ∈ Σi be two
different strategies for the player i. The convex combination
of the strategies is a strategy σ3i ∈ Σ computed for each in-
formation set Ii ∈ Ii and action a ∈ A(Ii) as follows:
σ3i (Ii)(a) = (6)
piσ
1
i (Ii)σ1i (Ii)(a)p + piσ2i (Ii)σ2i (Ii)(a)(1 − p)
piσ
1
i (Ii)p + piσ2i (Ii)(1 − p)
We search for a value of p that maximizes the gain, and
we call this approach the counterfactual COMB. Contrary to
COMB, the RQR can be directly applied to EFGs. The idea
is the same, but instead of regret matching, we use CFR. We
call this heuristic algorithm the counterfactual RQR.
Algorithms for Computing QSE
In general, the mathematical programs describing the QSE
in NFGs and EFGs are non-concave, non-linear problems.
We use the gradient ascent (GA) methods (Boyd and Van-
denberghe 2004) to find these programs’ local optimum. In
case a program’s formulation is concave, the GA will reach
a global optimum. However, both formulations of QSE con-
tain a fractional part, corresponding to a definition of the fol-
lower’s canonical quantal function. Because concavity is not
preserved under division, accessing conditions of the con-
cavity of these programs is difficult. The GA performs well
on small games, but it does not scale at all even for moder-
ately sized games, as we show in the experiments.
Because QSE and QNE are usually non-equivalent con-
cepts even in zero-sum games (see Figure 1), the regret-
minimization algorithms will not converge to QSE. How-
ever, in case a quantal function satisfies the so-called pretty-
good-response condition, the algorithm converges to a strat-
egy of the leader exploiting the follower the most (Davis,
Burch, and Bowling 2014). We show that a class of simple
(i.e., attaining only a finite number of values) quantal func-
tions satisfy a pretty-good-responses condition.
Proposition 6. Let G = (N,A,u) be a zero-sum NFG, QR
a quantal response function of the follower, which depends
only on the ordering of expected utilities of individual ac-
tions. Then the RM-QR algorithm converges to QSE.1
An example of a simple quantal function depending only
on the ordering of expected utilities is, e.g., a function as-
signing probability 0.5 to the actions with the highest ex-
pected utility, probability 0.3 to the action with the second-
highest utility and probabilities 0.2/(∣ A2 ∣ −2) to all re-
maining actions. Note that the class of quantal functions
satisfying the conditions of pretty-good-responses still takes
into account the strategy of the opponent (i.e., the responses
are not static), but it is limited. In general, quantal functions
do not satisfy the condition of pretty-good-responses.
Proposition 7. Let QR be canonical quantal function with
a strictly monotonically increasing generator q. Then QR is
not a pretty-good-response.1
5 Experimental Evaluation
The experimental evaluation aims to compare solutions of
our proposed algorithm RQR with QNE strategies computed
by RM-QR for NFGs and CFR-QR for EFGs. As baselines,
we use (i) Nash equilibrium (NASH) strategies, (ii) a best
convex combination of NASH and QNE denoted COMB,
and (iii) an approximation of QSE computed by gradient as-
cent (GA), initialized by NASH. We focus mainly on zero-
sum games, because they allow for a more straightforward
interpretation of the trade-offs between gain and exploitabil-
ity. Still, we also provide results on general-sum NFGs. Fi-
nally, we show that the performance of RQR is stable over
different rationality values and analyze the EFG algorithms
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Figure 2: Running time comparison of COMB, GA, RQR,
NASH, SE and QNE on general-sum NFGs (left) and zero-
sum EFGs (right). NFGs are square, and size is the number
of actions for each player.
more closely on well-known Leduc Hold’em game. The ex-
perimental setup and all the domains are described in the
appendix. The code will be published and is appended.
Scalability
The first experiment shows the difference in runtimes of GA
and regret-minimization approaches. In NFGs, we used ran-
dom square zero-sum games as an evaluation domain, and
the runtimes are averaged over 1000 games per game size
with [-10,9] integer payoffs. In EFGs, the generation proce-
dure for random games does not guarantee the games will
have the same number of histories, so we clustered games
with a similar size together, and report runtimes averaged
over the clusters. The results on the right of Figure 2 show
that regret minimization approaches scale significantly bet-
ter – the tendency is very similar in both NFGs and EFGs,
and we show the results for NFGs in the appendix.
We report scalability in general-sum games on the left
in Figure 2. We generated 100 games of Grab the Dol-
lar, Majority Voting, Travelers Dilemma, and War of At-
trition with an increasing number of actions for both play-
ers and also 100 randomly generated general-sum NFGs of
the same size. In the rest of the experiments, we use sets
of 1000 games with 100 actions for each class. We use a
MILP formulation to compute the NE (Sandholm, Gilpin,
and Conitzer 2005) and solve for SE using multiple linear
programs (Conitzer and Sandholm 2006). The performance
of GA against CFR-based algorithm is similar to the zero-
sum case, and the only difference is in NE and SE, which
are even less scalable than GA.
Gain comparison
Now we turn to a comparison of gains of solutions of all al-
gorithms in NFGs and EFGs. We report averages with stan-
dard errors for zero-sum games in Figure 3 and general-
sum games in Figure 4 (left). We use the NE strategy as a
baseline, but as different NE strategies can achieve different
gains against the subrational opponent, we try to select the
best NE strategy. To achieve this, we first compute a fea-
sible NE. Then we run gradient ascent constrained to the
set of NE, optimizing the expected value. We aim to show
that RQR performs even better than an optimized NE. More-
over, also COMB strategies outperform the best NE, despite
COMB using the (possibly suboptimal) NE strategy com-
puted by CFR.
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Figure 3: Gain comparison of GA, Nash(SE), QNE, RQR
and COMB in - Left: random square zero-sum NFGs with
number of actions as size. Right: random zero-sum EFGs.
 * W '  0 9  5 Q G  7 '  : R $
 * D P H  Q D P H
 
 
 
 
 
  
 ( [
 S H
 F W
 H G
  X
 W L O
 L W \
 & 2 0 %  * $  5 4 5  5 0 4 5  1 $ 6 +  6 (
 * W '  0 9  5 Q G  7 '  : R $
 * D P H  Q D P H
 
 
 
 
 
  
 ( [
 S H
 F W
 H G
  X
 W L O
 L W \
 & 2 0 %  * $  5 4 5  5 0 4 5  1 $ 6 +  6 (
Figure 4: Gain and Robustness comparison of GA, Nash,
Strong Stackelberg (SE), QNE, COMB and RQR in general
sum NFGs. On the left is expected utility against LQR and
right against such BR that is maximizing leader’s utility.
The results show that GA for QSE is the best approach
in terms of gain in zero-sum and general-sum games if we
ignore scalability issues. The scalable heuristic approaches
also achieve significantly higher gain than both the NE base-
line and competing QNE in both zero-sum and general-sum
games. On top of that, we show that in general-sum games,
in all games except one, the heuristic approaches perform as
well as or better than SE. This indicates that they are useful
in practice even in general-sum settings.
Robustness comparison
In this work, we are concerned primarily with increasing
gain. However, the higher gain might come at the expense of
robustness–the quality of strategies might degrade if our ex-
pected behavioral model of the opponent is incorrect. There-
fore, we study also (i) the exploitability of computed solu-
tions in zero-sum games and (ii) expected utility against the
best response that breaks ties in our favor in general-sum
games. Both correspond to performance against a perfectly
rational selfish opponent.
First, we report the mean exploitability in zero-sum games
in Figure 5. Because the exploitability of NE is zero by def-
inition, we do not include NE in the figure. We show that
QNE is highly exploitable in both NFGs and EFGs. COMB
and GA perform similarly, and RQR has significantly lower
exploitability compared to other modeling approaches. Sec-
ond, we depict the results in general-sum games on the right
in Figure 4. By definition, SE is the optimal strategy and pro-
vides an upper bound on achievable value. Unlike in zero-
sum games, GA outperforms CFR-based approaches even
against the rational opponent. Our heuristic approaches are
not as good as entirely rational solution concepts, but they
always perform better than QNE.
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Figure 5: Robustness comparison of GA, COMB and RQR
in random EFGs (E(Nash) = 0).
Different rationality.
In the fourth experiment, we access the algorithms’ perfor-
mance against opponents with varying rationality parameter
λ in the logit function. For λ ∈ {0, . . .100} we report the
expected utility on the left in Figure 6. For smaller values
of λ (i.e., lower rationality), RQR performs similarly to GA
and QNE, but it achieves lower exploitability. As rationality
increases, the gain of RQR is found between GA and QNE,
while having the lowest exploitability. For all values of λ,
both QNE and RQR report higher gain than NASH. We do
not include COMB in the figure for the sake of better read-
ability as it achieves similar results to RQR.
Standard EFG Benchmarks
Poker. Poker is a standard evaluation domain, and contin-
ual resolving was demonstrated to perform extremely well
on it (Moravk et al. 2017). We tested our approaches on two
poker variants: one-card poker and Leduc Hold’em. We used
λ = 2 because for λ = 1, QNE is equal to QSE. We report the
values achieved in Leduc Hold’em on the right in Figure 6.
The horizontal lines correspond to NE and GA strategies, as
they do not depend on p. The heuristic strategies are reported
for different p values. The leftmost point corresponds to the
CFR-BR strategy and rightmost to the QNE strategy. The
experiment shows that RQR performs very well for poker
games as it gets close to the GA while running significantly
faster. Furthermore, the strategy computed by RQR is much
less exploitable consistently throughout various λ values.
This suggests that the restricted response can be success-
fully applied not only against strategies independent of the
opponent as in (Johanson, Zinkevich, and Bowling 2008),
but also against adapting opponents. We observe similar per-
formance also in the one-card poker and report the results in
the appendix.
Large game. We demonstrate our approach on Goofspiel
7, a game with almost 100 million histories to show the
practical scalability. While CFR-QR, RQR, and CFR were
able to compute a strategy, the games of this size are beyond
the computing abilities of GA and memory requirements of
COMB. CFR-QR has exploitability 4.045 and gains 2.357,
RQR has exploitability 3.849 and gains 2.412, and CFR
gains 1.191 with exploitability 0.115. RQR hence performs
the best in terms of gain and outperforms CFR-QR in ex-
ploitability. All algorithms used 1000 iterations.
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Figure 6: Left: Average over 100 games from set 2 of EFGs
with different rationalities. Expected utility against CLQR
(dashed) and BR (solid) is reported. Right: Expected util-
ity for different algorithms against CLQR (dashed) and BR
(solid) in Leduc Hold’em. p is a constant for both regret min-
imization approaches. NASH and GA are also reported and
QNE is the value of COMB or RQR with p = 1.
Summary of the Results
In the experiments, we have shown three main points. (1)
GA approach does not scale even to moderate games, mak-
ing regret minimization approaches much better suited to
larger games. (2) In both normal-form and extensive-form
games, the RQR approach outperforms NASH and QNE
baseline in terms of gain and outperforms QNE in terms of
exploitability, making it currently the best approach against
LQR opponents in large games. (3) Our algorithms perform
better than the baselines, even with different rationality val-
ues, and can be successfully used even in general games.
Visual comparison of the algorithms in zero-sum games is
provided in the following table. Scalability denotes how well
the algorithm scales to larger games. The marks range from
three minuses as the worst to three pluses as the best with
NE being the 0 baselines.
COMB RQR QNE NE GA
Scalability - 0 0 0 - - -
Gain ++ ++ + 0 +++
Exploitability - - - - - - 0 - -
6 Conclusion
Bounded rationality models are crucial for applications that
involve human decision-makers. Most previous results on
bounded rationality consider games among humans, where
all players’ rationality is bounded. However, artificial intelli-
gence applications in real-world problems pose a novel chal-
lenge of computing optimal strategies for an entirely ratio-
nal system interacting with bounded-rational humans. We
call this optimal strategy Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium
(QSE) and show that natural adaptations of existing algo-
rithms do not lead to QSE, but rather to a different solution
we call Quantal Nash Equilibrium (QNE). As we observe,
there is a trade-off between computability and solution qual-
ity. QSE provides better strategies, but it is computationally
hard and does not scale to large domains. QNE scales sig-
nificantly better, but it typically achieves lower utility than
QSE and might be even worse than the worst Nash equi-
librium. Therefore, we propose a variant of counterfactual
regret minimization which, based on our experimental eval-
uation, scales to large games, and computes strategies that
outperform QNE against both the quantal response opponent
and the perfectly rational opponent.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1. Let A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}, ai ∈ R, a1 =
max(A) > 0. Then it holds that
max(A) − soft max
λ
(A) ≤ W (1/e)
λ
+ (n − 2)e−1
λ
. (7)
Proof. We proceed by induction on the size of the set A.
Base case: Let n = 2. Because a2 ≤ a1, any a2 can be written
as a1x,x ≤ 1. For a given λ, the difference between max and
soft max can be written as
d(x) = a1 − a1eλa1 + a1xeλa1x
eλa1 + eλa1x .
To find a maximum of this function, we differentiate it by x,
which yields
d′(x) = −a1eλa1x(eλa1(λa1(x − 1) + 1) + eλa1x)(eλa1x + eλa1)2 .
For a1 > 0, the function d′ has a root
r = a1λ −W (1/e) − 1
a1λ
,
where W is the Lambert function. The root is unique, be-
cause the inner function eλa1(λa1(x − 1) + 1) + eλa1x is
increasing as its derivative is positive for all x ≤ 1. It is a
maximum of d, because d′′(r) < 0. By plugging the root
into the function d, we obtain the upper bound on the dis-
tance between max and soft max:
d(r) = W (1/e)
λ
,
which is independent on a1, a2.
Induction step: For a given ∣A∣ = n, assume max(A) −
soft maxλ(A) ≤ C. Consider a new an+1 ≤ a1. Again, we
set an+1 = a1x,x ≤ 1. For a given λ, the difference between
max and soft max can be written as
a1 − ∑ni=1 aieλai + a1xeλa1x∑ni=1 eλai + eλa1x ≤ C + (a1 − a1x)e
λa1x
eλa1
,
because the exp function is strictly greater than zero. To find
a maximum of the second term, we differentiate it by x:
((a1 − a1x)eλa1x
eλa1
)′ = a21λ(1 − x)ea1λ(x−1) − a1ea1λ(x−1).
As in the base case, for a1 > 0 the derivative has a root
r = 1 − 1
λa1
,
(a1 − a1r)eλa1r
eλa1
= e−1
λ
.
The root is unique, because the derivative is positive increas-
ing on (−∞,1−2/a1λ) and decreasing on (1−2/a1λ,1], as
differentiating it for the second time reveals. Therefore, we
obtain the upper bound
max(A ∪ an+1) − soft max
λ
(A ∪ an+1) ≤ C + e−1
λ
.
The result follows from the induction. Note that the upper
bound goes to zero as λ approaches infinity.
Theorem 1. Computing a QNE strategy profile in two-
player NFGs is a PPAD-hard problem.
Proof. Let G˜ be a 2-player NFG with strictly positive util-
ities, in which one of the players has n actions to play.
Computing an -NASH in G˜ is PPAD-complete (Daskalakis,
Goldberg, and Papadimitriou 2009). We show that comput-
ing QNE is PPAD-hard by reducing the problem of finding
-NASH in G˜ to a problem of computing a specific QNE in
G˜.
We construct the reduced game as follows: let the player
with n actions be the subrational player and let q be from a
logit class, i.e., q(x) = eλx for some λ. Assume that there
exists λ∗, such that for each  and each strategy σ△ of the
leader u▽(σ△,BR(σ△))−u▽(σ△,QR(σ△)) ≤ . Because
the leader plays fully rationally, his QNE strategy is a best
response. By the definition of λ∗, the follower’s QR is an
-best response. Therefore, by solving for QNE with q(x) =
eλ
∗x, we find an -NASH in G˜.
Each strategy σ of a leader generates expected utilities for
the follower, playing BR corresponds to max, playing QR
corresponds to soft max. Because the game we reduce from
has n actions, there are n expected utilities, we can hence
use the lemma. Setting λ∗ = W (1/e)

+(n−2) e−1
λ
finishes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. For any LQR function. There exists a zero-
sum normal-form game G = (N,A,u) with a unique NE -(σNE△ , σNE▽ ) and QNE - (σQNE△ ,QR(σQNE△ )) such that
u△(σNE△ ,QR(σNE△ )) > u△(σQNE△ ,QR(σQNE△ )).
A B C
X -6 9 9
Y 3 0 2
Proof. In the provided game, the only NE for player △ is( 1
6
, 5
6
) and QR against it results in expected utility 1.6438.
QNE strategy for player △ is (0.1744,0.8256) resulting in
expected utility 1.6366. Therefore, in this game with λ = 1
QNE is worse than NE against QR. For a different λ > 0, the
utilities can be re-scaled by 1
λ
to achieve a similar result.
Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. Let G be a two-player imperfect-information
EFG with perfect recall andQR be a quantal response func-
tion. Computing an optimal strategy of a rational player
against the quantal response opponent in G is an NP-hard
if one of the following holds: (1) G is zero-sum and QR is
generated by a logit generator q(x) = exp(λx) for some
λ > 0; or (2) G is general sum.
Proof. We reduce the problem of solving an instances of
the partition problem to finding QSE in a specific zero-sum
EFG. An instance of a partition problem is a multiset of pos-
itive integers (xi)i∈{1...n}. The question is whether there is
a set of indices I ⊂ {1 . . . n}, such that∑
i∈I xi = ∑i∈{1...n}∖I xi. (8)
For constructing the game we use a special NFG with two
distinct QSEs, which are different from the uniform strategy.
An example of such a NFG is depicted in Figure 7.
A B C
X 0 10 0
Y 0 0 10
Figure 7: An NFG and a criterion function of its QSE with
generator q(x) = exp(x).
In the first equilibrium, the rational player△ plays the first
action with probability s. The second equilibrium is when
she plays the second action with probability s. The expected
reward of △ when playing either of these strategies is m,
while any other strategy, and particularly the uniform strat-
egy, achieves a lower reward.
Now we can proceed to constructing the game, which
makes the rational player to commit to a strategy that
solve the partition problem. The game starts with a uniform
chance node. For each item, there is a subgame as indicated
in the game in Figure 8 (for two of the items xi and xj).
0 0 0 010 10
0 0xi xi
0 0 0 010 10
0 0xj xj
. . .
Figure 8: A constructed EFG for a partition problem.
There are two main components of each subgame. The
first component (on the left) – the NFG subtree – is the EFG
representation of the NFG game introduced earlier. To max-
imize her utility, the rational player △ is motivated to play
either the first action with probability s or 1 − s, but not a
uniform strategy. The second part – the partition subtree –
solves the partition problem.
Solvable instances First, we construct the QSE of this
game in case the partition problem has a solution, i.e., there
exists an index set I for which Eq. (8) holds. To maximize
the utility in the NFG subtrees, in each of her information
sets player △ chooses only from the two strategies s and
1 − s. For each item, if the item belongs to the set I , she
chooses the strategy s. If she chooses strategy 1−s, it means
the item is from the complementary set. The expected util-
ities of player ▽ of actions a1, a2 in the lower information
set are
u▽(a1) = 1
2n
⎛⎝−∑i∈I sxi − ∑i∈{1...n}∖I(1 − s)xi⎞⎠
u▽(a2) = 1
2n
⎛⎝−∑i∈I(1 − s)xi − ∑i∈{1...n}∖I sxi⎞⎠ .
Because I is the solution, we have u▽(a1) = u▽(a2) and
player ▽ is incentivized to play uniformly. The △’s utility
in the partition subtrees is hence
uU△ = ∑
i∈{1,...,n}
xi
4n
= 1
4n
∑
i∈{1,...,n}xi.
Next, we show that utility uU△ is optimal in the partition sub-
trees – player △ can never get a higher utility. Let x be a
vector of the multiset integers of the partition problem and
σ be a vector of arbitrary probabilities of playing the first
action in player △’s partition subtrees. We aim to prove that
for any σ and the corresponding vector of complementary
probabilities of playing the second actions 1−σ it holds that
1
2n
xTσq(−xTσ/2n) + xT (1 − σ)q(−xT (1 − σ)/2n)
q(−xTσ/2n) + q(−xT (1 − σ)/2n) ≤ uU△.
Simple algebra shows this is equivalent to
xT (σ − 1/2)(q(−xTσ/2n) − q(−xT (1 − σ)/2n)) ≤ 0. (9)
Because we have
q(−xTσ/2n)−q(−xT (1−σ)/2n) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ xT (σ−1/2) ≥ 0,
Eq. (9) always holds and uU△ is indeed an upper bound. Be-
cause player △’s utility is maximized in both the NFG and
the partition subtrees, it is a QSE and her utility if the parti-
tion problem is solvable is therefore
u∗△ =m/2 + 1/2n ∑
i∈{1,...,n}xi.
Unsolvable instances Second, assume that the partition
problem does not have a solution. We show that in this case,
the utility of player △ in the QSE will be always strictly
lower than u∗△. Observe that because QSE with solvable in-
stances achieves a maximum possible utility in the partition
subtrees, in order to attempt to reach the same overall util-
ity with unsolvable instances, player △ has to commit to the
solution of the NFG game. Therefore, in each partition sub-
tree, her only viable strategy is to play the first action with
probability either s or 1 − s. First, we analyze the utility of
player △ in case the strategy of player ▽ is not uniform.
From Eq. (9), it follows that in case a vector σ maximizes a
utility of player △, it holds that
xT (σ − 1/2)(q(−xTσ/2n) − q(−xT (1 − σ)/2n)) = 0.
Consequently, if the strategy is not uniform, the difference
in quantal functions is nonzero and it is easy to show that
also the scalar product xT (σ−1/2) never reaches zero, thus,
making impossible for a non-uniform strategy to be optimal.
Therefore, to achieve utility u∗△, player △ has to enforce a
uniform strategy of player ▽. Given that player △ has to
commit to either s or 1 − s in her upper information sets,
we analyze the conditions when player ▽ is incentivized to
play a uniform strategy. Let the set I be defined similarly as
earlier: an item belongs to I if the first action in player △’s
partition subtree is played with probability s. We have
u▽(a1) = u▽(a2) ⇐⇒ (1− 2s)∑
i∈{1...n}xi + (2s− 1)∑i∈{1...n}∖Ixi = 0.
Because there is no I such that the sums are equal and be-
cause by the setting of the NFG game s ≠ 1 − s, player△ never simultaneously enforces optimal utility in the NFG
game and the partition subtrees. Her utility is hence strictly
smaller than u∗△. By analyzing the QSE of the reduced game
we hence separate solvable and unsolvable instances of the
partition problem.
General-sum games The situation in non-zero-sum
games is even simpler. The structure of the proof is exactly
as the proof for zero-sum games above, but the role of the
NFG subtree can be played by the cooperative coordination
game:
A B
X 1,1 0,0
Y 0,0 1,1
For any quantal response function, player ▽ plays the action
with higher expected utility with a higher probability. There-
fore, the uniform strategy for player △ corresponds to the
strict minimum of his utility achievable against any quan-
tal opponent. Any other strategy will make the two actions
of player ▽ have different expected utilities and hence the
better will be played with probability more than 0.5, giving
player △ better reward than the uniform strategy. Since the
game is completely symmetric, it has two distinct QSEs.
A similar argument holds also for the partition subtree,
which stays unchanged from the zero-sum game. In solv-
able instances, player △’s commitment makes any quantal
player be indifferent and play uniformly. In case of unsolv-
able instance, one of her action will be better and played
with a strictly higher probability. This will give player ▽
more utility than the uniform strategy and hence it would be
suboptimal for player △.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 6. Let G = (N,A,u) be a zero-sum NFG, QR
a quantal response function of the follower, which depends
only on the ordering of expected utilities of individual ac-
tions. Then the RM-QR algorithm converges to QSE.
Proof. A response function f is called a pretty-good-
response if it satisfies
u▽(σ△, f(σ△)) ≥ u▽(σ△, f(σ′△)) ∀σ△, σ′△ ∈ Σ△.
(10)
Let QR be a simple quantal response function of the fol-
lower, which depends only on the descending ordering of
expected utilities of follower’s actions and consider two dif-
ferent σ△, σ′△ ∈ σ△. In case σ△ induces the same order-
ing as σ′△, then u▽(σ△,QR(σ△)) = u▽(σ△,QR(σ′△)).
Let σ△ induce an ordering of indices i1, i2, . . . , in and
σ′△ induce a different ordering j1, j2, . . . , jn. By defini-
tion of a quantal function, QR(σ△, ai1) ≥ QR(σ△, ai2) ≥⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≥ QR(σ△, ain) and QR(σ′△,j1 ) ≥ QR(σ′△, aj2) ≥⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≥ QR(σ′△,jn ). For each k ∈ [n] it holds that
u▽(σ△, aik)QR(σ△, aik) ≥ u▽(σ△, aik)QR(σ′△, ajk) and
therefore u▽(σ△,QR(σ△)) ≥ u▽(σ△,QR(σ′△)). Simple
QR is hence a pretty-good-response and RMQR converges
to a strategy exploiting pretty-good-responses the most,
which is a QSE strategy.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7. Let QR be canonical quantal function with
a strictly monotonically increasing generator q. Then QR is
not a pretty-good-response.
Game 3
A B
X b a
Y c a
Figure 9: An example of NFG for which no monotonically
increasing canonical quantal function constitutes a pretty-
good-response.
Proof. In Figure 9, we construct a game G with A▽ =(A,B), such that no canonical quantal function is a pretty-
good-response in this game. Let a, b, c ∈ R, such that a <
b < c. Since q is strictly monotonically increasing, we have
q(a) < q(b) < q(c). By the definition of canonical quantal
response, we have QR(Y,A) − QR(X,A) = QR(Y,B) −
QR(X,B). Because q(b) < q(c), both sides of the equa-
tion are positive. Since a < b it holds that b(QR(Y,A) −
QR(X,A)) > a(QR(Y,B) − QR(X,B)), therefore
bQR(Y,A)+aQR(Y,B) > bQR(X,A)+aQR(X,B) and
finally u▽(X,QR(Y )) > u▽(X,QR(X)). By definition in
Equation (10), QR is hence not a pretty-good-response.
B Evaluation
Experimental setup. For all experiments except Goof-
spiel 7, we use Python 3.7. We solve non-linear optimiza-
tion using the SLSQP GA from the SciPy 1.3.1 library. LP
computations are done using gurobi 8.1.1, and experiments
were done on Intel i7 1.8GHz CPU with 8GB RAM. Goof-
spiel experiment was run on 24 cores/48 threads 3.2GHz (2
x Intel Xeon Scalable Gold 6146) with 384GB of RAM, im-
plemented in C++. For experiments on zero-sum NFGs, we
used randomly generated square games and for general-sum
NFGs we used randomly generated games, Grab the Dol-
lar, Majority Voting, Traveler’s Dilema and War of Attrition
from GAMUT (Nudelman et al. 2004). For EFGs, we used
randomly generated sequential games, and Leduc Hold’em.
In the experiments, we wanted to measure the scalability and
performance of the proposed solutions and the baseline.
Domains. Randomly Generated NFGs are parametrized
by sizes of both players’ action spaces. Utilities are gener-
ated uniformly at random from integers between -9 and 10.
Grab the Dollar is a game with a prize that both players
can grab at any given time, actions being the times. If both
players grab it at the same time they both receive low payoff
and when one player grabs the price before the opponent she
receives high payoff and the opponent payoff somewhere be-
tween high and low. In Majority Voting the players have
utilities assigned to each action (candidate) being declared
winner. And the winner is the candidate with the most votes.
In a tie a candidate with higher priority is declared winner.
Travelers Dillema is a game where both players propose a
payoff and the player with lower proposal wins the payoff
plus some bonus and the opponent receives the payoff minus
some bonus. In a War of Attrition, two players are in a dis-
pute over an object, and each chooses a time to concede the
object to the other player. If both concede at the same time,
they share the object. Each player has a valuation of the ob-
ject, and each players utility is decremented at every time
step. Randomly Generated EFGs are EFGs where players
switch each turn. The game has three parameters. One is the
branching factor b, the second is the maximal number of ob-
servations received o, and the last one is maximal sequence
length for one player l. Therefore, the maximal depth is 2l.
The path from the root correlates utilities, and the genera-
tion of utilities proceeds as follows. The value is set to 0
at the root and randomly changes by one up or down each
time when moving to the children. The utility of a history
is the value with which the leaf node is reached. We gener-
ated four sets in following way. Set 1: b = 3, o = 2, l = 1, 2:
b = 3, o = 2, l = 2, 3: b = 5, o = 3, l = 2, 4: b = 5, o = 3, l = 3.
During the generation we discarded the games where NE
strategy was the same as GA strategy because such degener-
ate games would have all the values that we report the same.
We kept generating and discarding until we had 100 games
in each set. Number of games we had to generate in order
to obtain 100 non degenerate games in each set is: 1 - 1431,
2 - 212, 3 - 159, 4 - 112.For Leduc Hold’em we use the
definition from (Lockhart et al. 2019). Goofspiel 7 is a bid-
ding card game where players are trying to obtain the most
points. shuffled and set face-down. Each turn, the top point
card is revealed, and players simultaneously play a bid card;
the point card is given to the highest bidder or discarded if
the bids are equal. In this implementation, we use a fixed
deck with K = 7.
C Mathematical program to solve QSE
Observation 8. LetG be an extensive-form game and a q be
a generator of a canonical quantal function. Then QSE of G
can be formulated as a following non-concave mathematical
program:
max
r△ v△(root) (11)
ri(∅) = 1 ∀i ∈ N (12)
0 ≤ ri(si) ≤ 1 ∀si ∈ Si,∀i ∈ N (13)
ri(si) = ∑
a∈Ai(Ii) ri(sia) (14)∀si ∈ Si, Ii ∈ infi(si),∀i ∈ N
vi(I) = ∑
a∈Ai(I) fi(I, a)ri(sia) (15)∀I ∈ Ii, si = seqi(I),∀i ∈ N
r▽(s▽a) = r▽(s▽)q(f▽(I, a))∑a∈A▽(I)q(f▽(I,a)) (16)∀s▽ ∈ S▽, I = inf▽(s▽),∀a ∈ A▽(I)
f▽(I, a) = ∑
I′∈I▽∶s▽a=seq▽(I′) v(I ′) + ∑s△∈S△ u(s△, s▽a)r△(s△)
(17)∀I ∈ I▽, s▽ = seq▽(I),∀a ∈ A▽(I)
f△(I, a) = ∑
I′∈I△∶s△a=seq△(I′) v(I ′) + ∑s▽∈S▽ u(s△a, s▽)r▽(s▽)
(18)∀I ∈ I△, s△ = seq△(I),∀a ∈ A△(I)
Equation 11 is for maximizing the expected value of
player △ in the root over his realization plans.
Equation 12 fixes probability of empty realization plan to
1, Equation 13 constraints realization plans as probabilities
and Equation 14 defines the relationship of child plans to
their parents. Equation 15 defines vi(I) as sum of values in
each children times the realization plan there. Equation 16
defines the quantal response in realization plans of player▽. Finally Equations 17 and 18 define the action value sum-
ming over both descendant infosets and terminal nodes. Be-
cause of Equation (16), the program is not linear. The prob-
lem of computing the QSE is computationally difficult to
solve – it is an NP-hard problem.
D Scalability on NFGs.
Figure 10 shows running time averaged over 1000 games for
each size of square zero-sum NFGs. Ranging from 2 actions
up to 377 actions.
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Figure 10: Running time comparison of COMB, GA, RQR,
NASH(SE), and QNE on zero-sum NFGs
E One card poker results.
Figure 11 shows the expected utility of the COMB and RQR
when run with fixed p, for different values of p. CFR results
are on left end of the RQR and COMB lines and CFR-QR is
on the right end.
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Figure 11: Expected utility for different algorithms against
CLQR (dashed) and BR (solid) in one card poker. p is a con-
stant for both regret minimization approaches. NASH and
GA are also reported and CFR-QR is the value of COMB or
RQR with p = 1.
